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Abstract
We argue that since there are several impediments to international risk sharing,
the welfare gains from full international risk sharing, which have been the object
of analysis in the previous literature, are not suggestive. Instead, we study the
gains from feasible risk sharing and find that they are considerable (0.5%
increase in permanent consumption). Marginal benefits from further risk sharing
are low, which indicates that feasible risk sharing can achieve most of the
benefits from internationalrisk sharing. Surprisingly, we find that sharing short
term consumption risk lowers welfare. On the basis of the results we make
suggestions on how to improve existing international risk sharing systems.
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There is ample evidence that risk sharing across countries is far from optimal. Sørensenand
Yosha (1998), for example, …nd that insurance among OECD countries is basically zero.
French and Poterba (1991) report that, for some major countries, the percentage of assets
invested in domestic markets is between 80% and 90%, while standard portfolio theory
suggests that households should hold internationally diversi…ed portfolios. It is therefore
hotly debated whether agents forgo sizeable gains from diversi…cation. Several studies have
addressed this issue and have estimated the welfare gains from fully eliminating the lack of
risk sharing. Most of them …nd that the gains are in fact considerable, although estimates
vary widely. Not surprisingly, it is a common view that the current degree of international
risk sharing is unsatisfactory.
We argue in this paper that the welfare gains from full risk sharing are not a good
basis for evaluating the bene…ts from further risk sharing. This is because there are several
impediments to international risk sharing that prevent full risk sharing or can make risk
sharing undesirable. For example, a high degree of risk sharing leads to large transfers
between countries that are di¢cult to enforce among sovereign nations. Moreover, risk
sharing commonly amounts to insurance of consumption and income, which reduces the
incentives for countries to produce and creates moral hazard.
It is therefore appealing to examine whether risk sharing that is feasible in the presence
of such imperfections is worthwhile. This is the primary aim of this paper. In order to
do so, we compute the welfare gains from international risk sharing that is restricted to
have transfers that sum up to zero. Moral hazard and enforceability are then of limited
relevance. Moreover, we aim is sidestep some of the assumptions made in the previous
literature on the gains from international risk sharing. The motivation is that, in spite
of the extensive literature,1 there is no consensus regarding the likely size of the welfare
gains. Recent estimates vary as widely as from less than 0:1% to more than 100%. Van
Wincoop (1999) in his survey of the literature …nds that variations are caused by di¤erent
assumptions on the implicit risk-free interest rate, the risk-adjusted growth rate and the
1See surveys in Tesar (1995), Lewis (1996) and Van Wincoop (1999). Furthermore, there is the related
literature that measures the costs of business cycle ‡uctuations, starting with Lucas (1987).
2endowment uncertainty. We propose a method to compute ex-post welfare gains from
historical consumption data, which does not require to specify any of this parameters.2
Welfare gains are further sensitive to the speci…cation of the preferences.3 We therefore
develop a second approach that employs Euler equations and that is largely independent
of assumptions on preferences. It is based on the idea that market interest rates re‡ect
intertemporal optimization of households and can be used to value consumption streams
over time.4
We measure the welfare gains for the G7 countries in the period from 1956 to 1992. For
our …rst approach, which uses standard preferences, we …nd average gains of 0:5% (mea-
sured as increase in permanent total consumption). In contrast, the welfare gains implied
by interest rates are very small (lower than 0:1%). This di¤erence can be attributed to the
failure of standard preferences to take account of many aspect that have been found im-
portant in explaining asset prices. In particular, non-expected utility does not separate the
intertemporal substitutability from risk aversion. For power utility for example, plausible
values of risk aversion imply an elasticity of substitution that is much lower than what is
needed to reconcile asset price moments. An alternative explanation for the di¤erences in
gains is that in the presence of borrowing constraints, interest rates may not fully re‡ect
intertemporal optimization and will give a distorting picture of the welfare gains.
The estimates from standard utility suggest that further risk sharing can indeed be
worthwhile. It is true that the welfare gains are moderate in contrast to some estimates for
full international risk sharing. For a comparable sample and method, Van Wincoop (1999)
…nds gains in the range of 1:1% to 3:5% increase in permanent tradeables consumption.5
2Athanasoulis and Van Wincoop (2000) follow a similar approach, they estimate the endowment un-
certainty from growth regressions.
3Campbell and Cochrance (1999) match the equity premium with habit persistence and …nd large gains.
Aquivalently, matching the parameters of standard preferences to the equity premium also implies high
welfare gains (Lewis, 2000). Obstfeld (1994) shows that the use of expected utility can distort the welfare
gains by failing to separate the intertemporal subsititutability from risk aversion.
4Alvarez and Jermann (2000) also use asset prices to estimate gains from reducing risk. Their approach
di¤ers from ours in the sense that they estimate a process for risk premiums which …ts asset data and then
use the process to value consumption streams, while we directly extract information about intertemporal
marginal rates of substitution from actual asset prices.
5Tradeables make up for roughly half of the total consumption spending in Van Wincoop’s sample.
3Feasible risk sharing, however, is easier to implement and does not create incentive prob-
lems. Our analysis also indicates that extending risk sharing beyond feasible risk sharing
does not yield substantial welfare gains. This is because the marginal bene…ts from risk
sharing decline considerably and are small for a household with feasible risk sharing. We
also …nd that sharing yearly consumption risks causes welfare losses. We argue that this
is a natural result for countries that di¤er mainly with respect to cyclical risk.
Our results suggest that existing international risk sharing is far from optimal. This is
because it leads to redistribution that certainly has its costs by distorting incentives. Its
gains, on the other hand, are questionable because they can also be reaped, at least partly,
by relying on risk sharing that does not cause redistribution. In the concluding section of
the paper, we make some proposals for improving international risk sharing along these
lines.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the rationale for
feasible international risk sharing and the restriction to risk sharing without redistribution.
In section 3, we model the measurement of the welfare gains. Section 4 applies the method
to the G7 countries. The …nal section concludes.
2 Feasible Risk Sharing
Why is full international risk sharing unlikely to arise? If countries were fully insured
against consumption risk, this would lead to considerable transfers between countries in
case countries develop di¤erently. Since countries are sovereign, these payments will be
di¢cult to enforce. Moreover, in the absence of the ability to contract on risk (i.e., by
contracting on shocks), risk sharing leads to insurance. A country that is fully insured
against ‡uctuations in its income or consumption has no incentives to use its resources for
production and distortions, as for example in the labor-leisure choice, can arise. Further,
full risk sharing requires sharing risk in perpetuity, it is di¢cult to imaginesuchagreements
in practice.6
Consequently, if one wants to study gains from risk sharing that is achievable and this
without causing additional costs (such as through distortions caused by moral hazard), one
6Moreover, the gains of risk sharing in perpetuity may not be de…ned, see Van Wincoop (1994).
4has to restrict risk sharing such that it results in lowcross-border transfers (enforceability),
yields a low degree of insurance (moral hazard), and has a restricted horizon. In this
paper we consider risk sharing that is restricted by the condition that the sum of ex-post
transfers are zero.7 Moral hazard can then not arise because a country cannot in‡uence its
net transfers. Enforceability issues are limited because there is no ex-post redistribution.
This de…nition of risk sharing e¤ectively measures the gains from international smooth-
ing of consumption (but rules out insurance of shocks). Beyond the smoothing of business
cycle ‡uctuations, it would also allows smoothing of permanent shocks. In contrast to full
risk sharing, the per period gains are not sensitive to the horizon of risk sharing because
widening di¤erences between countries over time cannot be smoothed. For the estimation,
we simply set the horizon of risk sharing equal to the sample period (roughly 40 years).
3 Measuring Welfare Gains
Under international risk sharing, the representative consumer in the home country receives
every period anamount of e Ct (whichis ashareof worldconsumption) inexchange for giving






t=1Ct, where n is the horizon of risk sharing. The welfare gains under








where ± is an appropriate discount-factor. Following the convention in the literature to










Beside studying feasible risk sharing over the whole sample period (business cycle risk),
we also study the gains from sharing yearly consumption innovations (i.e., where ‡uctua-
tions beyond one period will not be smoothed).
7This is of course an arbitrary choice. By imposing relative strong restrictions we think of e¤ectively
measuring a lower bound on the gains from feasible risk sharing.





1 for domestic consumption C1, with g and g¤ being the home and







)¡ u(C1(1+ gain))] (3)
Sharing Business Cycle Risk In contrast to above, the duration of a contract
is now T > 1 with payments taking place in each period. To de…ne contracts without
redistribution, we detrend fCtgt¸0 and fC¤
t gt¸0 by the ex-post growth rates g and g¤ to
obtain: CD
t := Ct=(1+g)t and C¤D
t := C¤
t=(1+g¤)t and de…ne the exchange ratio between
CD
t and C¤D























t are thesample means ofCD
t andC¤D
t .9 Note that theessential di¤erence
between (3) and (4) is that in the former the terms of exchange are adjusted every period
(for the current levels of C and C¤) but are …xed in the latter. We set later ± = 1 in
(4) because a data point at the end of the sample should be treated equal to one at the









t , respectively, when referring to equation (4), and write
C¤
1 for C¤
1 ¢ C0(1 +g)=C¤
0(1+ g¤) when referring to equation (3).
Example: The Welfare Gains with Power Utility For arepresentative consumer








1=(1¡°) ¡ 1 (5)
where ° is the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion.
8Using ex-post growth rates ensures that the payments from the contract average out over the whole
sample period.
9The de…nitions of contracts do not ensure that in every period the consumption in the countries add
up to world consumption. However, the deviations are negligible.
63.1 The General Case
Our aim is to transformthe expression for the welfare gains (equation 3 or 4) inan equation
of observables without fully specifying preferences nor assuming (or estimating) a process
for consumption. To do so, we …rst approximate u(C1 + 4x) by u(C1) + u0(C1) 4 x in
(3). By doing so we measure the gains from international risk sharing at constant marginal






Equation (6) shows that the gains from risk sharing are determined by the expected con-
sumption weighted with marginal utilities. Since there are no di¤erences in ex-post con-
sumption (zero redistribution), gains can only arise from the fact that the ’timing’ of world
consumption is better, i.e., world consumption is above domestic consumption if marginal
utility is high (a bad state) and below domestic consumption if marginal utility is low (a
good state).
The Euler equation for the representative consumer is:
u0(C1) = ±(1+ r1)E1[u0(C2)] (7)
where r1 is the one-year domestic spot rate at t = 1.10 Approximating u0(C0 + 4x) by
u0(C0) + u00(C0) 4 x to substitute for u0(C2) in (7) and plugging the result into (6), one
obtains:
gain =
E0[±(1+ r1)E1[u0(C0) + u00(C0)(C2 ¡ C0)]C¤
1]
E0[±(1 +r1)E1[u0(C0) +u00(C0)(C2 ¡ C0)]C1]
¡ 1 (8)









where °(C0) = ¡u00(C0) ¢ C0=u0(C0) is the relative risk aversion parameter at time t = 0.
Equation (9) is now an equation in the observables (C0;C1;C¤
1;C2;r1) and the (at time t
known) relative risk aversion °(C0).
10Note that we do not require an international version of the Euler-equation to hold.
73.2 Deriving Bounds for the Welfare Gains
An estimator for gain could be obtained from (9) by replacing the expected value E1[C2]
with C2 (E[¢] is with rational expectations unbiased). However, such a procedure is im-
precise since it requires replacing expectations of expected values by their realizations.
Instead, we analyze E1[C2] for two stylized consumption processes and argue that the es-
timates obtained for these processes provide lower and upper bounds for the true welfare
gains.
Temporary Shocks If innovations to consumption are temporary at t > 0 (i.e., fully






Persistent Shocks If shocks are persistent (and detrended consumption follows a








If the true consumption process follows a more general pattern, i.e., has innovations
which are partly temporary and partly persistent, equation (10) tends to understate the
welfare gains. The intuitive reason is as follows. If households build their expectations on
the basis of a temporary shock, a change in marginal utility is fully re‡ected in interest
rates, while if the shock has also a persistent component, interest rates change less because
they are accommodated by changes in expected next period consumption. Measuring the
gains by assuming a mean reversion process (temporary shock) will thus dampen the gains
since it reduces the variation in marginal utility implied by the interest rates (and therefore
reduces the potential for welfare gains from risk sharing). Correspondingly, a random walk
overstates the welfare gains because changes in marginal utility fully map into changes
11Equation (11) still contains the risk aversion parameter °. It serves here to identify expected next
year’s marginal utility (as it becomes clear from the Euler equation and the following approximation)
and does not directly translate into welfare gains (the main in‡uence of the risk aversion comes through
changes in current marginal utility, which is directly measured by the interest rates). In fact, estimated
gains from (11) are relative insensitive to °.
8in expected future utility (persistent shocks). Interest rate changes will then overstate
changes in marginal utility. Consequently, estimates on the basis of assuming this two
consumption processes will bound the true welfare gains:
gainT · gain · gainP (12)
The appendix shows that (12) is ful…lled for a consumption process that has temporary
and persistent innovations and derives the general conditions for (12) to hold.
4 The Empirical Evidence
We compute the welfare gains for G7 countries (United States, Germany, Canada, France,
United Kingdom, Italy and Japan) between 1956-1992 according to equations (5), (10)
and (11). The data come from the Penn World Table (real per capita consumption),
OECD Macroeconomic Indicators and Datastream (money market interest rates). World
consumption C¤
t is computed from the per capita consumption of the countries (where all
countries are weighted equally). Interest rates are, when available, the market rates on
one-year treasury bills (otherwise we preferred shorter maturities). Real interest rates are
obtained by de‡ating with ex-post in‡ation.12
The gains are computed by replacing the nominator and denominator in equations
(5),(10) and (11) by their respective sample means. For the relative risk aversion ° we
assume a value of 3. The results for equation (5) are summarized in Table 1. We …nd aver-
age gains for sharing business cycle risk of about 0:5% increase in permanent consumption.
This number is at the lower end of estimates from the risk sharing literature but in line
with studies assuming stationary processes, i.e., Obstfeld (1994) and Tesar (1995) estimate
gains of less than 0:5%. The average gains from sharing yearly risk are negative (¡0:4%).
The explanation for that is simple: if a country is at the trough of a business cycle (and
marginal utility is high) it is expected to growth. Sharing current consumption growth
with a country that is at the peak is not bene…ciary since this country is expected to have
a lower consumption next period.
12Alternatively we tried real interest rates computed from current and lagged in‡ation and obtained
similar results.
9We also compute the marginal bene…ts from risk sharing. Setting u0(C1) = C
¡°
1 in (6)










We …nd average marginal gains of 0:9% for business-cycle risk sharing and losses of 0:2%
for one-year contracts (not reported in Table 1). The marginal bene…ts evaluated at world







Equation (14) has been derived from (6) by replacing u0(C1) with u0(C¤
1) = (C¤
1)¡°. As
reported in Table 1, the marginal gains from sharing further business cycle risk are small on
average (0:1%) and again negative for the yearly risk (¡0:4%). As one would expect, the
marginal gains from reducing consumption variability fall with a reduction in consumption
variability, we …nd marginal gains from full risk sharing of business cycle risk to be much
smaller than the initial marginal gains from sharing business cycle risk (0:1% < 0:9%).
Analogous, since sharing one-year risk seems to increase consumption variability, marginal
costs will raise with the degree of risk sharing (¡0:2% > ¡0:4%). The low marginal gains
for the business cycle contract suggests that the potential gains from sharing consumption
risk beyond the business cycle risk are small (or that much larger transfers are necessary
to induce further signi…cant welfare gains).
The welfare gains implied by Euler equations (equations 10 and 11) are negligible
(contained in Table 2). They are for both, the business cycle and the one-year contract,
lower than 0:1%. The interval for the true gains given by the boundaries (jgainP ¡ gainTj)
is surprisingly narrow. It is then quite appealing that out of 14 cases, only in one case the
boundary condition (12) is violated.13
What can explain the striking di¤erence between the estimates from power utility and
interest rates? One explanation is that in the presence of borrowing constraints and het-
erogeneity, the Euler equation does not hold for all households. Interest rates changes do
then not fully re‡ect underlying aggregate consumption variability (idiosyncratic risk is
13For Canada, the mean reversion estimate for the business cycle contract (¡0:10%) is larger than for
the random walk (¡0:13%).
10washed out in either measure), which may understate or overstate the welfare gains. On
the other hand is known that standard preferences fail to match important moments of
asset prices. Remedies to these puzzles have been o¤ered by assuming habit persistence
(Constantinides, 1990, Campbell and Cochrane, 1999 ) and non-expected utility (Weil,
1989, Epstein-Zin, 1991). Habit persistence helps to match the equity premium by increas-
ing the volatility of marginal utilities (the stochastic discount factor). A higher volatility
of the discount factor increases, ceteris paribus, the gains from risk sharing (as equation 6
con…rms). Non-expected utility allows to distinguish between risk aversion and intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution, which has been shown to be important for the costs of
consumption ‡uctuations (Obstfeld, 1994).
The advantage of the interest rate approach is that it does not require to take a stance
onthese preferences, in fact equations (10) and (11) are very similar for thehabit formation
speci…ed by Constantinides (1990), where per period utility is u(xt) with xt = ct ¡ ht and
ht = ®ct¡1denotes habit. The same is true for the non-expected function proposed by
Weil (1990), which allows to separate risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability. The
intuition is that both alterations of preferences change the welfare gains through changing
the response of marginal utilities to changes in consumption. Since changes in marginal
utilities are directly measured by interest rates, the interest rate approach can e¤ectively
capture habit persistence and non-expected utility even though it is based on standard
preferences.
By equation (10) and (11), the welfare gains depend on the covariance of interest rates
with (augmented) measures of domestic and world consumption. For a given correlation
between both, a reduction in the variance of interest rates will therefore lower the gains
from welfare. In our data, the variance of the interest rates is much lower than what would
be implied by standard preferences (power utility with ° = 3). This is known as the ’low
volatility of the risk-free rate puzzle’ (see Bansal and Yaron, 2000 ). To our knowledge,
habit persistence has not been able to explain this puzzle (habit persistence also drops as
a potential explanation for the di¤erences in gains because it tends to increase the welfare
gains). On the other hand, there is a direct relation between the intertemporal elasticity
and the volatility of the risk-free rate, i.e., an increase in the former reduces the latter (see
for example Bansal and Yaron, 2000). Bansal and Yaron match all important asset price
11moments (including the risk-free rate volatility puzzle) with anintertemporal substitutabil-
ity Ã of around 2. In contrast, for the case of power utility Ã is forced to be the inverse of
the risk aversion. For ° = 3 this implies Ã = 1=3, which is way below the parameter esti-
mated by Bansal and Yaron.14 The reason why the intertemporal substitutability plays a
role for welfare gains is the following. While risk aversion determines the ’per period gains’
from a reduction in risk, the welfare gains from smoothing consumption over time are de-
termined by the intertemporal substitutability. A high Ã means that agents are willing
to substitute consumption across time, the welfare bene…ts from smoothing consumption
are therefore lower. Understating the elasticity of substitution overstates then the welfare
costs of consumption ‡uctuations.
Since the liquidity constraint-heterogenous agents approach has not been able to match
important asset price moments (i.e., it cannot resolve the tension between the equity pre-
mium and the low risk-free rate puzzle and does not help to lower the volatility of the
risk-free rate), we view the failure of standard preferences to take explicitly account of the
intertemporal substitutability as the more convincing candidate for explaining the di¤er-
ences in gains. This would imply that standard preferences (which have been used almost
exclusively in the literature) overstate the welfare gains. An exception is Obstfeld (1994)
who …nds that varying Ã from 0:05 to 0:5 changes the welfare costs of consumption ‡uctua-
tions for the U.S. by the factor 8¡10. However, in his paper an increase in Ã increases the
gains from reducing consumption variability for the considered parameter range. While we
have no fully convincing explanation for that, it should be noted that measuring marginal
utilities by interest rates does not require specifying a value for Ã.
It may surprise that the welfare gains implied by asset data are low since stock market
data have been accounted for implying large welfare gains (see for example the analysis in
Lewis, 2000). This is because the high observed equity premium has been explained by
high risk aversion or by higher risk than implied by the variance of aggregate consumption.
However, as noted by van Wincoop (1999), there is not necessarily a relation between the
equity premium and the welfare gains from reducing consumption variability. Our analysis
14It should be noted that there is a substantial uncertainty with respect to plausible paremeters for Ã,
estimates range from less than 0:1 (Hall, 1978) to more than 2 (Attanasio and Webber, 1989, and Hansen
and Singleton, 1984).
12con…rms this: equation (10) and (11) show no apparent relation to the equity premium
and imply that the welfare gains are solely determined by covariance between interest rates
and consumption.
5 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the welfare gains from risk sharing that can emerge in
the presence of imperfections, such as moral hazard and sovereign risk. The gains were
computed without fully specifying the consumption process and preferences, …rst, by using
an ex-post approach to measure the gains, and, second, by deriving information about
intertemporal marginal rates of substitution from market interest rates. We found that the
welfare gains implied by interest rates are negligible (less than 0:1%), which is in contrast
to estimates obtained from a power utility function (0:5%). The latter estimate suggests
that expanding international risk sharing, despite impediments, is worthwhile.
This can be done in accordance with our analysis as follows. Countries could share
national income risks by making transfers when the income of a country deviates from
some moving average of the country’s income. Such an arrangement would be similar to
the consumption risk sharing studied in the paper. It allows only for limited redistribution
because any permanent divergence in the development of countries will not be insured
since the moving average will eventually adjust to the new income level. In contrast to
fully sharing national income risks (as proposed by Shiller, 1993 ), incentive problems for
governments are limited. This is because a reduction in national income will also lower
average income and reduce payments in the periods to come. Since transfers are quite
restricted and cannot persist over periods (this would require an accelerating growth rate),
there is limitedscope for default in the presence of substantial gains from suchrisk sharing.
Our results have implications for existing risk sharing systems. Since the marginal gains
from risk sharing beyond feasible risk sharing are small, risk sharing that causes redistribu-
tion may be undesirable because the bene…ts can be largely reaped without incurring costs
by exploiting the gains from feasible risk sharing. Moreover, since the evidence shows that
sharing short term risk can in fact reduce welfare, existing risk sharing systems should be
checked on whether they provide such short term insurance.
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156 Appendix: Bounds for the Welfare Gains
Let the foreign consumption process be constant and normalized to zero: fC¤
t gt¸0 = 0.
Home consumption is hit every year by a shock "t which is either permanent or temporary
(vanishes in the next period). Home consumption is then:
Ct = Ct¡1 + "t ¡ (1 ¡Dt¡1)"t¡1 (A1)
where the stochastic dummy variable Dt assumes the value 0 if the shock "t is temporary
and 1 if the shock is permanent. Shock "t is normally distributed with zero mean. The
dummy Dt is independently distributed with 0 < P(Dt = 0) < 1 and P(Dt = 0)+P(Dt =
1) = 1. Home consumption and shock at time 0 are assumed to be zero (C0 = 0, "0 = 0),
thus expected home consumption equals foreign consumption.
We show that for the given consumption process equation (12) is ful…lled if the gains
are expressed in absolute instead of relative terms. The absolute versions of equations (9),
(10) and (11) are:
gainA = E0[(1 +r1)(C¤






T = E0[(1 +r1)(C
¤
1 ¡ C1)] (A3)
gain
A
P = E0[(1 +r1)(C
¤




Then, for (12) in absolute terms to be true, (A5) and (A6) have to hold:
gainA ¡ gainA













]]] · 0 (A6)
Simplifying (A5) and(A6) yields the following general conditions for equation(12) to hold:
E0[(1 +r1)(C
¤
1 ¡ C1)(E1[C2] ¡ C0)] · 0 (gain
A ¡ gain
A
T ¸ 0) (A7)
E0[(1 +r1)(C
¤
1 ¡ C1)(E1[C2] ¡ C1)] ¸ 0 (gain
A ¡ gain
A
P · 0) (A8)
For the given consumption process, (1 + r1)(C¤
1 ¡ C1)(E1[C2] ¡ C0) can be simpli…ed to
¡(1 + r1)"2
1 · 0 if D1 = 1. For D1 = 0, the expression vanishes. Hence, condition (A5)
is ful…lled. Analogous, (1 + r1)(C¤
1 ¡ C1)(E1[C2] ¡ C1) is (1 + r1)"2
1 ¸ 0 for D1 = 0 and
becomes zero for D1 = 1. Thus, also condition (A6) is ful…lled.
16Table 1: The Welfare Gains Computed from Power Utility
Total Gains Marginal Gains
Business Cycle 1-year Business Cycle 1-year
United States 0.0% 0.2% -0.1% 0.2%
Germany 0.2% -0.7% -0.1% -0.8%
Canada 0.5% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2%
France 0.3% -0.3% 0.2% -0.4%
United Kingdom -0.1% 0.4% -0.6% 0.3%
Italy 0.5% -0.4% 0.3% -0.5%
Japan 1.8% -2.1% 0.6% -2.1%
Average 0.5% -0.4% 0.1% -0.4%
Gains are expressed as percentage increase in permanent consumption for the period 1956-1992.
Total gains are estimated from equation (5), while marginal gains are estimated from equation (14)
Table 2: The Welfare Gains as Implied by Interest Rates
Business Cycle 1-year
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
U.S. 0.01% 0.04% 0.01% 0.04%
Germany -0.01% 0.08% 0.01% 0.08%
Canada -0.10% -0.13% 0.00% 0.15%
France -0.04% 0.00% -0.02% 0.00%
U. K. 0.09% 0.15% 0.01% 0.15%
Italy -0.10% -0.03% -0.02% 0.08%
Japan 0.12% 0.35% -0.03% 0.09%
Average 0.00% 0.07% -0.01% 0.08%
Gains are expressed as percentage increase in permanent consumption for the period 1956-1992. Lower
bounds are estimated from equation (10), while upper bounds are estimated from equation (11)
17